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FIXING WHAT’S BROKEN: THE OUTDATED GUIDELINES OF THE 






In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA) to afford privacy protections to electronic 
communications and it has not changed since its inception.  The 
ECPA has proven problematic as technology has advanced, but 
Congress has not modified the law to reflect this change.  Courts 
have struggled to apply the law to both old technologies that have 
been updated and new technologies that have emerged.  The ECPA 
needs to be revised to reflect the new advances in technology or be 
repealed and replaced with a new approach.  This will ensure that 
consumer data will be safeguarded while in the hands of data 







* J.D. Candidate 2021, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Touro Law Center. My interest in the 
subject of data protection stems from how extensive technology was a part of my 
upbringing. The amount of information and entertainment at my disposal not only 
kept me informed and distracted, but also made me want to ask questions. Is this 
website safe? Should I be uploading my sensitive information to this website? 
What is keeping my information safe? The rise of technology also brought with it 
the rise of hacking, something all of us have had to deal with at some point. The 
underlying goal of this note was to understand how the law has attempted to 
manage the internet and protect its users from the exploitation of others. The 
ultimate objective of this note is to propose changes to the current legal structure of 
data protection statutes to ensure stronger safeguards for our data and technologies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the current technology-dependent age, the lack of 
safeguards against unreasonable invasions of consumer data from 
third parties poses troubling implications for consumers.1  Back in 
1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) to afford privacy protections to electronic communications.2  
Title 1 of the ECPA amended the federal Wiretap Act to address the 
interception of electronic communications, while Title II created the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA) to handle access to stored wire 
and electronic communications and also transactional records.3  
Congress created the ECPA because it noted the “gap in protection 
and the potentially devastating effects it had on privacy.”4  However, 
times have changed and the technology available has changed also.  
Companies today maintain physical hard drives or servers of data 
with inadequate supervision, leaving them susceptible to breaches.5  
The companies escape blame by not actively taking part in divulging 
the information.6  This information can come in the form of incoming 
and outgoing emails.7  Companies can share such generally stored 
data with the government if it is for a legal purpose.8  This applies 
even if the government entity obtained the information beyond the 
scope of its reach and the customer did not receive notice.9  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set a standard, known as the 
“knowingly divulged” standard first seen in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 
that states if a defendant obtains consent through exploitation of a 
known mistake, such as going beyond the scope of a subpoena, he 
cannot seek refuge in that consent if it relates to the essential nature 
of his access.10  The standard set by the Ninth Circuit, however, does 
 
 
1 Simon M. Baker, Unfriending The Stored Communications Act: How The 
Technological Advancement And Legislation Inaction Have Rendered Its 
Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 78 (2011). 
2 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002). 
3 Id. 
4 Baker supra note 1, at 80. 
5 Id. 
6 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). 
7 Id. at 1072.  
8 Id. at 1071. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 1073. 
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not take into account a company passively allowing the information 
of its customers to be undefended against intrusions resulting from 
mistakes such as overextending one’s reach.11  These passive 
breaches of consumer data protection occur because the SCA is 
outdated in light of today’s modern technology that has far surpassed 
the current protections that were created in the 1980s.12  The 
application of the SCA eventually made it into areas of private life, 
like social media, and produced confusing results.13   
Despite the SCA’s flaws, the Ninth Circuit will continue to 
use it until Congress acts.  The Ninth Circuit has struggled to 
determine the law involving facets of social media such as “likes” 
and smartphones that gather geographic data, and has failed to 
address the inability for some providers to fit within the remote-
computing services (RCS) and electronic communications services 
(ECS) categories of the SCA.14  Companies that have allowed 
consumer data to be shared and taken by the government on the 
request of third parties should be held to a stricter standard as 
regulated in an amended version of the SCA or a completely new 
approach.  
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones,15 NetGate, an internet service 
provider (“ISP”), was forced to disclose emails on the order of a 
subpoena.16  Farey-Jones’ attorney was only supposed to request in 
the subpoena the relevant e-mails or e-mails from a certain period.17  
However, the subpoena was too broad in scope and time.18  After 
discovering that the subpoena was invalid, rendering the disclosure of 
the emails improper,19 the plaintiff brought a claim arguing that 
NetGate’s consent to the subpoena was invalid.20  The scope of the 
disclosure went to the heart of the subpoena, and as such, NetGate 
 
11 Id. 
12 Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying The Stored Communications Act To The Civil 
Discovery Of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2012). 
13 Id. at 1292-93. 
14 Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp. 6 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Rainsy v. 
Facebook, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Quon v. Arch 
Wireless Operating Co., Inc. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). 
15 Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1071. 
18 Id. at 1072.  
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
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did not have the authority to relinquish control of its client’s emails.21  
The Ninth Circuit coined the “knowingly divulged” standard, stating 
that if a mistake went to the essential nature of the invasion of 
privacy, it would invalidate such invasion.22  This offense, however, 
is an exception, as the SCA, enacted in the 1980s, was not equipped 
to handle the problems caused by emails and social media, such as 
the scope and limitations of disclosing emails and the rise of social 
media and its features.23  The ECS and RCS categories within the 
statute have not withstood the test of time, and new technologies such 
as social media are seemingly incompatible with it.24  This Note will 
discuss the reasons the SCA should be amended, if not repealed as a 
whole. 
Section II will explain the SCA’s various provisions relating 
to the disclosure of data to third parties.  Section III will examine 
both the Ninth Circuit’s approach and the evolution of its standards 
during the past two decades.  Section IV will focus, specifically, on 
the case of Theofel v. Farey-Jones and its articulation of the 
“knowingly divulged” standard.  Section V will argue in favor of 
amending or repealing the SCA and discuss alternatives to better 
accommodate emerging technologies.  Finally, Section VI will 
conclude that the SCA’s flaws outweigh its usefulness, and it should 
be either amended or repealed. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE SCA AND OTHER DATA PRIVACY 
LEGISLATION 
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA)25 to afford privacy protections to wired and 
stored communications.26  Title I of the ECPA amended the federal 
Wiretap Act27which existed prior to the ECPA, and handled 
electronic communications, which consists of the information users 
share via websites.28  The main objective of Title I is to protect the 
 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 1073. 
23 Burshnic, supra note 12, at 1264. 
24 Id. 
25 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).  
26 Id. 
27 18 U.S.C. § 2510 
28 Id. 
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privacy of persons in connection with the use of electronic and wire 
communications.29  
Title II of the ECPA, also known as the SCA, is used by 
aggrieved parties seeking relief for breaches of their electronic 
information.30  While the SCA was enacted in 1986 to address the 
lack of guidelines in the Fourth Amendment in the area of computer 
technologies, it failed to account for the internet and the possible 
ramifications the SCA could have on individual privacy.31  The court 
in Low v. LinkedIn Corp.32 explained that the SCA was enacted to 
assign criminal and civil liability “for certain unauthorized access to 
stored communications and records.”33  However, the SCA has a 
limited scope and does not address all online transgressions.34  
Specifically, the SCA prohibits entities that store information from 
“knowingly divulg[ing]” that information to other outside entities.35  
However, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that reckless and negligent 
conduct in maintaining user information only meets the “knowingly 
divulged standard” when the provider sends the information to a 
person or entity that is not the intended recipient.36  This does not 
take into account the provider sending a certain amount of 
information that goes beyond the scope or limits of the disclosure.  
Despite the static nature of the SCA, Congress has not changed the 
statute and now the law is outdated and difficult to use.37  
A. The SCA’s Two Entities: RCS and ECS 
The SCA focuses on two types of entities: RCS and ECS.38  
The SCA defines an RCS as a service that provides computer storage 
or processing services to the public through an electronic 
communications service.39  In other words, RCS refers to an 
electronic communication service that stores and processes data of 
 
29 Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Va. 2004).  
30 Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
31 Id. 
32 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Worix v. MedAssets, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 (E.D. Ill. 2012).  
37 Baker, supra note 1, at 78. 
38 Id. at 85 
39 Id. at 86. 
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consumers that subscribe to the service.40  Next, the SCA defines an 
ECS as an entity that provides its users with the ability to send or 
receive wire or electronic communications.41  For example, a 
provider that supplies email services would be considered an ECS.42  
An ECS, therefore, handles the actual transmission of that 
information, whether the information is being received or being 
transferred to another party.   
Significantly, whether an entity is an RCS, ECS, or neither 
plays a critical role in asserting an entity’s non-disclosure 
obligations.43  If the entity is not in the RCS or ECS category, the 
entity can reveal or use the contents however it wishes.44  Whether an 
entity is an ECS or RCS depends upon what information is 
disclosed.45  It is common practice today for businesses to store their 
data with external providers.46  Although most ISPs function as both, 
the distinction is important because different services offer different 
protections.47  
B. SCA Punishment and Exceptions 
The SCA specifies the punishment for violating the statute.48  
The statute provides punishment for offenses committed while 
attempting to gain “commercial advantage, malicious destruction or 
damage, or private commercial gain, or in furtherance of any criminal 
or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or any State.”49  If the offenders are found guilty under § 
2701(b) of the SCA, they can receive a fine and up to ten years in 
prison, but if the offense cannot be categorized under § 2701(b), then 
the maximum sentence they can receive is a fine and five years.50  





43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 87.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
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conduct was authorized.51  Specifically, if access was authorized “by 
the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications 
service,” or, “by a user of that service with respect to a 
communication of or intended for that user,” then no penalty would 
be applicable.52  
In addition, Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (“CFAA”) in 1986 to address the problem of computer hacking.53  
It provides criminal penalties to those who accessed a computer 
without authorization to commit fraud.54  The aggrieved party must 
show that the computer accessed was protected, the party attempting 
to gain access was not authorized to use the computer, that the party 
had the intent to commit the crime and the party defrauded the owner 
of something of value.55 
III. CASES WHERE INADEQUATE SECURITY PRACTICES CAUSED 
INJURY 
The courts in several cases determined that the companies that 
held the aggrieved parties’ information had caused them injury 
through their inadequate security practices.56  In Low, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs had brought an actionable cause for 
relief.57  In that case, the plaintiffs suffered harm when LinkedIn 
transmitted their LinkedIn data, including their browsing history and 
identification to third parties as well as advertisers, marketing 
companies and data brokers.58  This allowed third parties to recreate 
the plaintiffs’ user identity and gather sensitive information about the 
plaintiff from their browsing history.59  The court found that the 
plaintiffs’ alleged violation of surveillance statutes gave it a 
 
51 Id. § 2701(c). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1060.  
54 U.S. v. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057-58 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  
55 Id. 
56 See McDonald v. Kiloo ApS, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1033 (N.D. Cali. 2019); 
Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Freedman v. 
America Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Va. 2004); In re Pharmatrak, 
Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 
F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001). 
57 Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.  
58 Id. at 1017. 
59 Id.  
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“concrete” foundation that supported Article III standing.60  The court 
disagreed that LinkedIn could be classified as an RCS or ECS 
because it did not meet the SCA standards.61  The court found that 
LinkedIn was not an RCS because it was not holding or processing 
the offsite third party’s information, specifically their profile URLs 
and their LinkedIn IDs.62  This information was generated by 
LinkedIn itself and not sent by the users.63  If LinkedIn could be 
categorized as an RCS or ECS it would have been held liable, but the 
court held that LinkedIn could not be categorized as an RCS.64  
LinkedIn does not take the user IDs and URLs and store them with a 
third party (in this case LinkedIn) and the same applies with the 
user.65  Had LinkedIn functioned as an advanced computer program 
that processed information, it would have been classified as an RCS, 
but the court found otherwise.66  
In McDonald v. Kiloo ApS67 the district court decided that the 
plaintiffs had alleged an actionable claim for violation of the SCA 
against the companies holding and transmitting their data.68  In that 
case, the plaintiffs sued both the developers of the apps their children 
used, Disney, Kiloo, and Viacom, as well as the SDK defendants.69  
The SDK defendants were a group of mobile advertising and 
monetization companies that provided kits for collecting user data.70  
The plaintiffs’ complaints alleged that the SDK defendants were 
coordinating together to collect recovered data from children for the 
purpose of profiling and targeting children with specific 
advertisements.71  To collect the data, Disney, Kiloo, and Viacom 
were provided a specific code that would transmit consumer data to 
the SDK for data tracking and ad targeting.72  The extensive data 
gathered on the child-users allowed SDK to create sophisticated 
 
60 Id. at 1021. 
61 Id. at 1023.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 1028. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1029. 
72 Id. 
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profiles of the children.73  SDK would then send their profiles to third 
parties, allowing third parties to target them with advertising based 
on those profiles.74  Disney relied on New York General Business 
Law Section 349(a) to discredit the plaintiffs’ claims.75  To bring a 
violation of consumer protection under New York law, the plaintiffs 
had to show that the companies engaged in deceptive practices.76  
The court agreed that the breadth of the company’s data collection 
efforts violated the New York statute and the plaintiffs were entitled 
to relief.77  
The court held that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient 
claims under the New York and California consumer protection 
statutes, stating respectively that the companies had indeed collected 
the information and utilized it under New York law, and that the 
collection of the data was unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent under 
California law.78 
In Freedman v. American Online, Inc.,79 the district court 
determined that the ISP, American Online (AOL), had a reasonable 
basis to question the validity of a warrant it received.  In this case, an 
internet service subscriber sued two police officers and AOL for 
violating his rights when the officers accessed his private information 
retained by the provider in connection with an obscene email other 
parties had received.80  The court stated that AOL met the 
“knowingly divulg[ing]” standard of the ECPA by transmitting the 
information to the Police Department after requesting it.81  As a 
result, the court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff.82  While 
AOL claimed that it did not have the requisite state of mind specified 
in the statute to knowingly divulge the information, since it relied on 
a defective warrant before divulging the consumer information to the 
police, the court rejected the defendant’s contention.83  The court 
stated that AOL did not need a specific state of mind; rather, it only 
 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 1029. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1038-39. 
79 412 F. Supp. 2d 174 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
80 Id. at 180.  
81 Id. at 183.  
82 Id. at 180.  
83 Id. at 183. 
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had to divulge the information to another party intentionally, 
regardless of the reason.84  
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Pharmatrak, Inc.85 
determined that defendant Pharmatrak’s website intercepted the 
messages within the meaning of the ECPA.86  The First Circuit 
agreed with the plaintiffs that the users of Pharmatrak’s website, 
NETcompare, did not consent to the tracking of their information.87  
Pharmatrak used the information to analyze where on the website its 
users visited so Pharmatrak could compare the tracking information 
to Pharmatrak’s competitors.88  Although Pharmatrak stated to its 
clients that the cookies89 it used to save data would not collect 
personal information, the personal information of over two hundred 
users was nonetheless found on Pharmatrak’s servers.90  The defense 
tried to argue that Pharmatrak did not meet the requirement of 
“intercepting” the communications as indicated in the statute.91  The 
statute defined interception as the acquisition of any information 
through the use of an electronic device.92  The website narrowed 
down the incoming communications to include interceptions that 
were contemporaneous with the transmission.93  The court decided 
that it satisfied this stipulation; the GIF,94 or the graphic interchange 
format, that enabled the interception to “sometimes arrive[d] before 
the content delivered by the pharmaceutical clients.”95  This 
interception happened either before or alongside the transmission.96  
The interception itself was done with NETcompare, an automatic 
routing program.97  Automatic routing programs are the only 
exception to the principle that interceptions of emails that are not 
 
84 Id. 
85 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003) 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 21.  
88 Id. at 13.  
89 What is a cookie?, ALL ABOUT COOKIES, 
https://www.allaboutcookies.org/cookies/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).   
90 In Re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 14.  
91 Id. at 22. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Andrew Heinzman, What is a GIF, and how do you use them? (Sept. 25, 2019) 
https://www.howtogeek.com/441185/what-is-a-gif-and-how-do-you-use-them/. 
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already prohibited by the Wiretap Act are impossible.98  Therefore, 
the court decided that, despite its intentions, Pharmatrak had 
intercepted its clients’ data and violated the ECPA.99   
In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.100 the First 
Circuit determined that the defendant, Explorica, had violated the 
CFAA in taking pricing data.101  Explorica was formed by ex-
members of EF (“Education First”) Cultural Travel as well as other 
institutions, and decided to compete in the teenage touring 
industry.102  The defendant used a scraper program that collected 
pricing information from EF and its users, allowing it to undercut 
EF’s prices in the tour market.103  Once this came to light during 
litigation regarding an individual’s departure from EF, the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that 
Explorica had exceeded authorized access into EF’s servers.104  The 
First Circuit affirmed, holding that EF exceeded the reasonable limits 
of its authorization when it began taking proprietary information.105   
In Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,106 the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the ECPA was meant to offer protection to any 
person, regardless of the status of his or her United States 
citizenship.107  The defendant Suzlon sought emails in a server 
maintained by Microsoft to use in a civil fraud proceeding against an 
Indian citizen.108  Microsoft argued that the disclosure of these emails 
would violate the ECPA, stating that the emails had to be 
discoverable in a foreign proceeding and that the subpoenas had to 
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.109  The Ninth 
Circuit found otherwise, saying that the ECPA provided disclosure to 
any person, without any qualification.110  A plain reading of the 




100 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001). 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 580. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 583-84.  
106 671 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2011). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 727.  
109 Id.   
110 Id. at 729. 
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well.111  The court also stated that this protection applies not only to 
acquisition by government entities, but also to civilian entities.112  
With this decision, the Ninth Circuit effectively extended the 
protections of the ECPA to foreign citizens and would next target 
social media corporations. 
A. SCA’s Impact on Social Media 
Despite the challenges and uncertainties of applying the SCA 
and ECPA to innovations such as social media, the court utilized 
them in its decision in Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc. 113 in a case 
involving Facebook.114  Before Crispin, the District Court for the 
Central District of California in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating 
Co., Inc.115 decided that social media sites such as Facebook could 
not be considered an ECS because the information was not privately 
held but put on public display.116  However, this court changed views 
upon reconsideration, holding that the ECS was meant to apply 
broadly to any service that facilitated email communications.117  The 
court also indicated that services such as Facebook provide private 
messaging services.118  Facebook, therefore, can be classified as more 
than an ECS but the judge relegated it to one category.  By doing so, 
the court attempted to apply a statute to an area that that it previously 
recognized was not suited for new technologies like social media.119  
Regardless, the court did not find evidence that the information was 
available to the public as dispositive.120  The fact that the information 
stored on Facebook was held in backup as storage for both the benefit 




112 Id. at 730.  
113 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
114 Id. 
115 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). 
116 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d. at 980.  
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 988.  
120 Id. at 990.  
121 Id.  
12
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B. Cases Where SCA Did Not Apply 
In the case of Casillas v. Cypress Insurance Co.122 the 
plaintiffs were unable to obtain relief because the Ninth Circuit held 
that the SCA did not apply.123  The plaintiffs, Hector Casillas and 
Adela Gonzales, stored their worker’s compensation information on 
the defendant’s website, which was maintained by a third party called 
HQSU.124  The plaintiffs’ information was accessed by the defendant, 
the website creator, at the behest of insurance investigators.125  The 
plaintiffs sued in the District Court for the Central District of 
California, but their complaint was dismissed for failure to state a 
claim for which relief can be granted.126  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s judgment denying them relief.127  It held that the 
website did not fit into the category of ECS, because the website’s 
users could not communicate directly with one another.128  Ninth 
Circuit precedent held that websites that allowed users to 
communicate with one another were permitted categorization as ECS 
providers.129  In analyzing the website in the Casillas case, the court 
stated that the plaintiffs had to download the documents they 
requested from the server, rather than from another user acting as a 
sender.130  In addition, the court recognized that the documents and 
comments did not travel directly from the sender to the recipient.131  
Therefore, the plaintiffs could not allege that a direct communication 
occurred.132  As a result, the website did not receive classification as 
an ECS and the plaintiffs were denied relief.133 
In Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp.134 the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington denied the plaintiff 
 
122 770 Fed. App’x 329, 330 (9th Cir. 2015). 
123 Id. 
124 Casillas v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, CV 15-04763 (JEMx), 
2017 WL 2813145 at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
125 Id. 
126 770 Fed. App’x at 330.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.at 331. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 6 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
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relief under the SCA135 because smartphones were classified as 
ECS.136  The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for collecting data 
relating to the user’s geographic location through its smartphone.137  
The court analyzed the SCA, but came across a problem when it 
reached the question of whether mobile phones are facilities.138  
Despite the SCA’s not defining a “facility,” the court began by 
working with the SCA’s definition of an “electronic communication 
service.”139  The court defined an ECS as any service which provides 
users with the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications, and specifically stated that electronic 
communications consisted of the sending of images, writings, signs 
and other information.140  Smartphones were considered electronic 
services under the Act, but the issue was whether they came within 
the definition of a facility.141   
The court held that smartphones did fit within the definition 
of a facility, stating that the “device enabled the use of the location 
services rather than providing them.”142  The SCA was meant to 
protect facilities operated by electronic communications service 
providers and maintaining electronic storage, not computers that 
enabled their use.143  In the present case, the plaintiff’s smartphone 
did not provide other users with geographical information, but 
received the relevant information from Microsoft.144  As a result, 
plaintiff’s phone could not be categorized as a server.145  The fact that 
the phone both received and sent data did not change that result 
because almost all smartphones transmit data to service providers.146  
Finally, the court explained that if it accepted the argument that the 
smartphone sent geographic information, then Microsoft was 
providing third parties with access to the plaintiff’s phone.147  Thus 
 
135 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a)(1). 
136 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. 
137 Id.at 1170. 
138 Id. at 1174.  
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the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 
denied the plaintiff protection.148 
The outcomes of Casillas and Cousineau provide examples of 
parties being denied relief because the facilities which processed the 
parties’ data did not fit within the definitions in the SCA.  In the case 
of Casillas, the website in which the plaintiffs stored their data could 
be categorized as an RCS, but not an ECS, so relief was denied under 
the SCA.149  This prevented the plaintiffs from successfully arguing 
that some services can be both RCS and ECS.150  In previous Ninth 
Circuit cases such as Quon,151 this distinction served to completely 
deny or grant liability under the statute.152  In Quon, the court granted 
the plaintiffs’ demands for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (a)(1) 
because the service that provided the plaintiffs a platform on which to 
post text messages could be classified as an ECS.153  In contrast, the 
court in Casillas found for the defendants even though the plaintiffs 
proved the website could be classified as an RCS because the 
plaintiffs created it pursuant to 2702(a)(1), which required the 
website to be identifiable as an ECS.154  
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND DATA PROTECTION 
The Ninth Circuit, in examining claims brought under the 
SCA, has attempted to reconcile the statutory text with the reality of 
the modern internet.155  Before the SCA, Congress hoped to address 
the inability of the Fourth Amendment to address invasions of 
privacy by new technologies with the passage of a new act.156  The 
Fourth Amendment regulated a large, growing field and the rapid 
development of technology revealed the weakness resulting from its 
age.157  Thus, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act, but it was limited in 
scope and was quickly outpaced by technological advances.158  
 
148 Id. 
149 Casillas v. Cypress Insurance Co., 770 Fed. App’x 329, 330 (9th Cir. 2015).  
150 Id. 
151 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008). 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 903.  
154 Casillas, 700 Fed. App’x at 331. 
155 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d. 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002). 
156 Baker, supra note 1, at 81. 
157 Id. at 80. 
158 Id. 
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Congress’s attempts to amend the act were not successful because the 
rapid advancement of technology kept outpacing Congress’s 
amendments.159  The ECPA was enacted in order to address the 
Wiretap Act’s deficiencies by adding amendments, and one of the 
ECPA’s most prominent provisions was the SCA.160  Thirty years 
later, it is the only act that addresses information held in storage 
despite the change in technology.161 
The SCA has changed little since its enactment in the 1980s 
and courts have struggled to apply its outdated definitions.162  The 
rapid rise of the internet reduced the SCA’s usefulness.163  The 
SCA’s original purpose was to address a crucial turning point for the 
Fourth Amendment as the internet was created.164  Specifically, its 
goal was to address the internet-based privacy violations that can be 
brought under the Fourth Amendment, such as the unauthorized 
access to e-mails by a government entity.165  However, its narrowly 
tailored mandate meant it could not be used in cases that do not 
involve violations of the Fourth Amendment.166   
Even when the SCA applies to an entity, it might not apply to 
the information being sought.167  For an ECS, providers are only 
prohibited from disclosing information that is held in storage.168  The 
SCA defines storage as information held in a computer server 
incidental to the electronic transmission as well as information that is 
held in a server for the purpose of backup protection.169  In contrast, 
an RCS is only prohibited from disclosing information being held in 
storage or for computer processing by its customers.170  Neither of 
these definitions provides for information that was intercepted.171  




161 Id. at 82. 
162 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d. 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2004).  
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Baker, supra note 1, at 87.  
168 Id. at 87.  
169 Id. at 87-88. 
170 Id.  
171 Id. 
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provide even more problems for those seeking to acquire information 
that is otherwise disclosable.172 
A. The Ninth’s Circuit Current Use of the SCA 
The Ninth Circuit continues to use the SCA to solve internet-
related problems that have no precedent to anything seen in the 
1980s.173  In Rainsy v. Facebook, Inc.,174 the District Court for the 
Northern District of California attempted to address the scope of 
protection afforded to a “like”175 when used on Facebook and 
whether the plaintiff who made the “like” could disclose his or her 
identity.176  The court stated that giving a “like” on Facebook equates 
to showing approval of the post, constituting it as “contents of a 
communication.”177  Under the SCA, “contents of a communication” 
concern the substance and meaning of the message.178  Since 
revealing the identity concerns the substance of the message, and 
since the message, the “like,” was one of approval, disclosure of the 
identity of the people who liked the post is precluded.179 
Another example of the Ninth Circuit using the SCA is 
presented in the case of hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn Corporation.180  On 
appeal, the court determined whether an injunction for hiQ Labs, an 
analytics company, against LinkedIn for invoking the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was appropriate.181  In hiQ Labs, 
LinkedIn decided to help employers find the employees they desire 
by presenting to them the data collected from LinkedIn’s servers.182  
The data collected by LinkedIn was present in its servers as a result 
 
172 Id. 
173 hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2019); Rainsy v. 
Facebook, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2018); In re Zynga Privacy 
Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). 
174 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
175 Kari Paul, Does the ‘Like’ Mean Anything Anymore?, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER 
(May 5, 2016), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/05/does-the-like-mean-
anything-anymore.html. 
176 Rainsy v. Facebook, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1114 (N.D. Cali. 2018). 
177 Id.  
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019). 
181 Id. at 992.  
182 Id. at 991. 
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of its nearly 500 million users.183  Previously, hiQ Labs was “data 
scraping” LinkedIn’s servers.184  Data scraping is the process of using 
automated bots and algorithms to mine other company’s websites for 
data, which here was LinkedIn, categorize that data and sell it to 
business clients.185  Once LinkedIn became aware of hiQ Labs’ 
activities, it sent a cease and desist letter alleging that by data 
scraping its website, hiQ Labs violated the CFAA.186 
The lower court granted hiQ Labs’ preliminary injunction and 
LinkedIn appealed.187  Although the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on 
the CFAA, it mentioned the SCA.  Specifically, it stated that the 
similarities between the SCA and the CFAA made it clear that the 
court should interpret the two statutes pari passu, or on an equal 
footing.188  The court noted the similar language, particularly in a 
provision from both statutes that stated if anyone were to access 
information from an electronic communications service without 
authorization, the accessor would be punished.189 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Konop remains the standard 
for cases concerning websites where electronic information is on a 
“wall,” even though that case dealt with electronic bulletin boards 
years before social media.190  The Ninth Circuit denied relief under 
the SCA, holding that Hawaiian Airlines’ use of the website was not 
at the standard required by the SCA.191  Since social media platforms 
like Facebook share similar purposes, they too should be governed by 
this standard.192  Comparing Facebook’s format to the online bulletin 
in Konop is similar to the issue with the SCA as a whole; it does not 
serve its purpose anymore.  In Konop, the messages sent to the 
bulletin board had to be opened to be accessed, while Facebook posts 
are readily visible to authorized users.193  As a result, there is no step 
where a Facebook post is held in storage as were the posts in Konop.  
This lack of compatibility illustrates the foundational issues that the 
 
183 Id.  
184 Id.  
185 Id. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 1002.  
189 Id. at 1002-03.  
190 Baker, supra note 1, at 101. 
191 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d. 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002). 
192 Baker, supra note 1, at 94. 
193 Id. at 101. 
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Konop test faces when applied to social media cases, and why the 
Ninth Circuit needs to reconsider its approach.  That method can only 
come about once Congress amends the SCA to address the outdated 
ECS and RCS categories or repeals it outright and enacts a new 
statute.  Once done so, this solution will provide a way to properly 
judge social media sites from older mediums that share data such as 
the electronic bulletin board in Konop.  
The court relied heavily on the similarities between the CFAA 
and the SCA in its determination as to whether hiQ Labs was 
precluded from alleging its claim regarding hiQ Labs’ gathering of 
data.194  The Ninth Circuit discussed its previous decisions in Konop 
to provide guidance on distinguishing between public and non-public 
websites.195  Konop and hiQ both dealt with websites that contain 
private information provided by their users that are protected by a 
username and password combination.196  In hiQ, the court recognized 
that websites that advertise themselves as confidential deserved 
protection, while those that are accessible to the public would not be 
able to impose liability on somebody else for accessing it.197  Since 
the information that LinkedIn was seeking to protect was not 
considered confidential or out of the reach of those hoping to access 
the data, the court could not hold hiQ Labs liable for accessing it.198  
If an effective statute had been in place, hiQ Labs would be liable for 
not providing a secure website. 
The next case provides an example of the use of the SCA to 
analyze a complicated matter when an updated statute would have 
performed better.  In the case of In re Zynga Privacy Litigation,199 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs could not 
allege a violation of the SCA against Facebook, the developer Zynga 
or third parties for receiving the Facebook IDs and URLs contained 
in the plaintiffs’ headers.200  The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by 
determining if the HTTP referrer information was applicable to the 
SCA’s provisions.201  The court searched through precedent as far 
 
194 Id. 




199 750 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). 
200 Id.  
201 Id.  
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back as the 1980s to define the meaning of the word “contents.”202  
The court found that the statute defines contents as any information 
that concerns the “substance,” “purport,” or “meaning” of the 
communication.203  The court turned to the dictionary definitions of 
those words in order to understand Congress’s intent.204  In short, 
after the court’s consideration of those dictionary terms, it defined 
contents as “a person’s intended message to another.”205  Although 
the information in the header could identify the users, the court 
interpreted the statute as expressly allowing this: it only prevents 
disclosure of content from a communication, not personally 
identifiable information.206   
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the record 
information can become content if it is the subject of a 
communication, but the court did not find this convincing.207  Using 
Pharmatrak as an analogy, the court stated that the header disclosed 
information about the user’s communication, not the communication 
itself.208  The plaintiffs also argued that the URLs could provide 
contents of a communication rather than record information and 
violate their privacy under the Fourth Amendment, but again, the 
court disagreed with their claims.209  Using the Fourth Amendment, 
the court held that the recorded information, as it stated in past cases, 
leaves no reasonable expectation of privacy, but content 
communication does.210  The court found it determinative that since 
the URL information includes only basic identification and address 




203 Id.  
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1106.  
206 Id. at 1107.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1108.  
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 1109. 
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V. THE IMPORTANCE OF THEOFEL V. FAREY-JONES  
Plaintiffs, officers of ICA, or Integrated Capital Associates 
Inc., sued the defendant Farey-Jones.212  During discovery, the 
defendant took action to acquire the e-mails from ICA about the case 
and proceeded to subpoena NetGate, the ISP in charge of holding 
ICA’s emails.213  NetGate, without consulting with ICA first and at 
the defendant’s insistence, relinquished to Farey-Jones over three 
hundred emails, some containing personal and sensitive 
information.214  In response, the plaintiffs brought this action against 
Farey-Jones and the attorney, alleging violations of the SCA and the 
CFAA.215  The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California decided that none of the statutes applied and dismissed 
the claims, and in response, the plaintiffs appealed.216  The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit previously dealt with this issue in the 
case of Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., and noted that other circuit 
courts have dealt with the issue differently.217  The First Circuit held 
in a case that access might be unauthorized under the CFAA if it is 
not in line with the reasonable expectations of the party granting 
permission.218  The Second Circuit also held that, in one case, access 
is unauthorized where that access is not related to the system’s 
intended function.219  In Theofel, the court compared the taking of 
electronic information to trespass: “[J]ust as trespass protects 
[people] who rent space in a commercial facility to hold sensitive 
documents, the [Stored Communications] Act protects users whose 
electronic communications are in electronic storage with an ISP . . . 
.”220 
In taking this approach, the court acknowledged that the 
defendant would not be held liable if the entry was authorized.221  
However, consent given can be invalidated if it was given through 
 
212 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 
213 Id.  
214 Id.  
215 Id. at 1072.  
216 Id.  
217 Id.  
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1072-73 (citations omitted). 
221 Id. 
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deceit.222  Consent is invalid if the deceit is so egregious that it goes 
to the essential nature of the act.223  The distinction between 
something minor and something major is best defined by the specific 
interests that an action for trespass was meant to protect.224  As the 
court summarized, “[p]ermission to access a stored communication 
does not constitute valid authorization if it would not defeat a 
trespass claim in analogous circumstances.”225  As a result, NetGate’s 
consent to the subpoena order was invalidated by the improper nature 
of this order.226  It violated the federal rules and allowed information 
that would have otherwise remained private to be exposed to another 
party that took few measures to prepare a proper order.227   
VI. ARGUMENT: WHY THE SCA NEEDS TO BE AMENDED OR 
REPEALED 
The most effective way to protect consumers from the 
growing threats to their data from third parties is to revise and amend 
the SCA and the accompanying statutes.228  According to one 
prominent computer law professor, Orin Kerr, the SCA “is dense and 
confusing, and few cases exist to explain how the statute works.”229  
Its classifications proved to be its most fatal flaw; in creating two 
types of providers, the ECS and the RCS, the SCA failed to provide 
guidance in cases where the providers did not fit in to these 
categories or could meet both.230  The SCA was also limited in scope 
as it was not “a catch-all statute designed to protect the privacy of 
stored internet communications.”231  Instead, it was narrowly created 
to address Fourth Amendment violations.232  As a result, judges have 




224 Id.  
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226 Id. at 1074.  
227 Id.  
228 Burshnic, supra note 12, at 1287. 
229 Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004). 
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designed to govern.233  Although the drafters of the statute based the 
SCA on the internet usages of the time, they did not have the 
foresight to implement measures in the statute to compensate for the 
internet’s rapid evolution.234  With certain measures in place, the 
SCA can be an efficient legislative tool in governing information 
cases regarding both updated and new technologies.  
The SCA only provides minimal protection against the 
disclosure of emails and other sensitive information to third parties, 
especially the government.235  Some stored information can be 
accessed with very minimal effort while the other party is only 
required to provide notice and serve a subpoena.236  In effect, the 
government can “often compel all opened e-mails from an ISP with a 
mere subpoena and without meaningful notice—precisely the result 
the SCA was enacted to avoid.”237  Congress’s reasoning behind the 
lower threshold in 1986 was to safeguard the right of privacy 
protected under the Fourth Amendment.238  However, this was meant 
to accommodate the Supreme Court’s understanding of the internet at 
the time.239  For example, it adhered to notions that if storage is not 
accessed for over 180 days, then it is considered abandoned.240  By 
anchoring the SCA on the Supreme Court’s understanding of the 
internet back in the 1980s, Congress failed to take into account the 
shifting importance of the internet in modern times.241  This also 
poses the concern about Congress’s lack of foresight and the courts’ 
as well; neither did Congress anticipate that technology would 
develop or anticipate that the SCA’s categories would be blurred.  
Specifically, Congress should have known that ECS and RCS 
definitions would overlap given that some entities fulfill both roles.  
Congress also should have anticipated that there would be confusion 
regarding specific phrases like “intentionally divulge.”  However, 
Congress allowed the statute to exist without any significant reform.   
 
233 Id. at 1214-15.  
234 See A Short History of the Internet, SCIENCEANDMEDIAMUSEUM (Dec. 3, 2020), 
scienceandmediamuseum.org.uk/objects-and-stories/short-history-internet. 
235 Id. at 1233. 
236 Id. at 1223. 
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The court in Crispin focused its inquiry on the wall posts of 
sites like Facebook and Myspace by utilizing its distinctions in 
Konop.242  In Konop, the court could not categorize the website used 
in that case as intermediate storage, but thought that it could be 
categorized as back-up storage.243  The issue that complicated matters 
in Konop was that it dealt with a BBS, or a bulletin board service.244  
It could not be categorized under the definition of an ECS because 
when the post reached the board, it was not in an intermediate stage 
and pending delivery to another source.245  However, the court 
reasoned that since the provider did not delete the post on the wall 
after it had been sent and read, it constituted storage that could be 
allocated as back-up storage.246  Also, because the BBS fulfilled the 
same purpose as Facebook or Myspace, it could not be differentiated 
and must presumably be held for back-up purposes.247  In the end, 
this reasoning only suggests that “the court was determined to apply 
the SCA whenever possible and that it was in favor of granting the 
protection the SCA offers.”248  The SCA could then, as a result, be 
used whenever somebody posts something onto social media.249  
Although it is tempting to consider the bulletin board of Konop as an 
analogy to social media wall posts, the court’s decision is more in 
line with its agenda to keep following the rigid guidelines of the 
SCA, interpreting the text to apply for today when it was better suited 
for the situations of the past.   
Finally, in Cousineau, the court admitted that it cannot define 
what the SCA regards as a “facility.”250  Instead, the court relied on 
precedent relating to computers and smartphones along with the 
SCA’s definition of “electronic communications service.”251  In 
applying the SCA, the court concluded that since mobile phones 
could not act similarly to SCA facilities by providing location 
services in a “server-like” fashion, mobile phones could not 
 
242 Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
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250 Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
251 Id. at 1175. 
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constitute an ECS.252  Even when evidence was presented that the 
mobile device both received and sent out information, the court 
dismissed the claim, saying that nearly all mobile devices transmit 
data to service providers.253  The definitions and standards the Ninth 
Circuit relied on in using the SCA illustrate the risks and dangers 
facing potential aggrieved parties as they attempt to seek relief. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
The plaintiffs in Theofel were already involved in litigation 
when their adversaries, hoping to gain an edge, made aggressive 
requests in pursuit of discovery that endangered the plaintiffs’ 
privacy.254  The plaintiffs were able to recover for the damages their 
adversaries cost them because the court held, based on its 
interpretation of the SCA, that the defendant’s knowledge of the 
invalidity of the subpoena evidenced knowledge of bad faith and 
negligence.255  However, many parties that have had their 
confidential information accessed under false guises of authorization 
were not as lucky.  To better safeguard the private information of the 
people, the SCA and the ECPA need to be amended to better conform 
to the people’s expectations for digital security.  
The SCA is based on technology from the 1980s and this 
creates confusion if it is amended. Instead, it should be restructured 
to account for modern technology.  As previously noted, the SCA and 
ECPA were both created at a time soon after the advent of the 
internet and have not been updated since.256  The statutory language 
does not provide suitable guidelines.  Specifically, trying to 
categorize certain services that provide electronic or wired services 
between RCS or ECS has created confusion and uncertainty.  These 
categories do not consider entities that can be classified as RCS or 
ECS.  Further complicating matters is that the courts continue to 
utilize the SCA and work within its archaic categories since Congress 




254 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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An alternative to outright repeal of the SCA would be to 
amend it to better accommodate internet advances.  The Ninth Circuit 
along with other circuits has grown familiar with the SCA over the 
past three decades.258  Without action from Congress, the Ninth 
Circuit has had little choice but to continue using the Act in response 
to the growing number of cases that involve information online and 
through platforms like social media.  However, courts have struggled 
to apply the SCA.  The various ways that information is being shared 
between users and companies use their users’ information to benefit 
their subscribers as well as themselves are scenarios to which the 
SCA will likely never adapt.  If the statute were to be repealed, courts 
would have to spend years learning new definitions that would surely 
be more complicated than the SCA is today.  There is also the chance 
that case law might be overturned should new amendments to the 
SCA be introduced.  However, amending the SCA would allow the 
law to conform to modern standards without creating the shock that 
would come with repealing the statute outright.  The creators of the 
SCA had good intentions, but the SCA of the future or a similar 
equivalent should be enacted or amended to consider the ever-
changing use of technology. 
 
258 The First Circuit looked towards the reasonable expectations of the party 
granting permission in making their judgment in one case, while the Second Circuit 
focused on whether the party’s access was related to the system’s intended 
function. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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